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In contrast with a growing literature on the drivers 
of aggregate volatility in developing countries, its 
consequences in terms of individual incomes have 
received less attention. This paper looks at the impact of 
cyclical output fluctuations and extreme output events 
(crises) on unemployment, poverty, and inequality. The 
authors find robust evidence that aggregate volatility 
has a regressive, asymmetric, and non linear impact, as 
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reflected in the strong influence of extreme output drops. 
The findings show that, in addition to the mitigating 
role of personal wealth, public expenditure and labor 
protection exert a similar benign effect. These findings 
are in line with the income substitutions view of social 
safety nets, and cast a new light on the value of social 
programs and labor market regulation in crisis prone 
developing countries. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of developing economies is their macroeconomic 
volatility. Output growth, exchange rates or current account balances tend to exhibit large 
and, in many cases, sudden variations, with deleterious and persistent impacts on social 
welfare. This volatility has been historically attributed to various country-specific factors that 
range from an excessive dependence on a few goods and services or a narrow tax base, to 
poor institutional quality and economic policies and, more recently, to a greater exposure to 
external shocks to commodity prices or global liquidity and risk aversion.
2 Whatever is its 
source, a precise understanding of the welfare consequences of macroeconomic volatility 
needs to go beyond the characterization of aggregate fluctuations. 
 
With the aid of an epidemiological analogy, we can usefully distinguish between three 
degrees of vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks: (i) the exposure to the pathogen agent 
(namely, the size and frequency of the shocks);
3 (ii) the propensity to catch a disease after 
being exposed (namely, the aggregate sensitivity to the shock as measured, for example, by 
the output response); and (iii) the resilience of the human body (namely, the consequences of 
aggregate volatility on individual incomes as captured, for example, by the effect of a sharp 
output drop on unemployment, school enrollment, poverty and inequality). Ultimately, much 
in the same way as the effect of a virus on the individual’s health reflects the combination of 
these three degrees, poverty ratios will depend on exposure (e.g., sharp changes in terms of 
trade), propensity (larger in open economies with rigid prices and limited access to 
international capital) and resilience (or lack thereof, as in the absence of a social safety net). 
 
The first two degrees have tended to dominate the debate on systemic vulnerability at the 
expense of the third. In contrast with a vast literature on the drivers of aggregate volatility in 
                                                 
2 The new perspective, partially triggered by emerging market crises in the 1990s, has been stressed, among 
many others, by Calvo (1988) and, more recently, Cole and Kehoe (1996). See also Hausmann and Velasco 
(2004) for a survey, and Gonzalez Rozada and Levy Yeyati (forthcoming) for empirical evidence.  
3 A pathogen is a disease-causing microorganism or related substance (e.g., a virus) or, more generally, a risk 
factor or a source of disease. 
  2developing countries,
4 the impact of the latter in terms of individual incomes has received 
little attention. The goal of this paper is precisely to characterize this impact and to examine 
potentially mitigating policies. More specifically, we assess the effects of aggregate volatility 
and extreme output fluctuations on key microeconomic dimensions such as inequality, 
poverty, labor income and school enrollment, and investigate the channels and mitigating 
factors underlying these effects.  
 
While the literature have examined the (bi-directional) link between growth and poverty,
5 the 
conventional view that recessions have deleterious effects in terms of social exclusion and 
human capital losses, particularly persistent and regressive in less developed countries, has 
received relatively little attention. A few empirical studies on the subject are worth noting. 
Breen and Garcia-Peñalosa (2005) show that output volatility and income inequality (as 
captured by the Gini coefficient and the income share of the top quintile) are positively 
correlated across countries.
6 Agénor (2004), based on a small 19-country panel, finds an 
asymmetric effect of real output growth per capita on poverty: deeper recessions tend to 
raise poverty, whereas faster recoveries do not reduce it in the same degree.
7 Evidence on a 
positive correlation between output volatility and inequality is also reported by Gavin and 
Hausmann (1998) and Laursen and Mahajan (2004): in the latter, inflation, financial depth, 
and government social security expenditures are considered as the suggested channels; in the 
former, it is the lack of safety nets, that forces low-income children drop out of school in 
bad times not to return in good times, thereby perpetuating income inequality. While these 
pieces are often either too fragmentary, based on a limited country sample or subject to 
methodologically shortcomings –and have therefore failed to make a convincing case in one 
                                                 
4 The literature on output volatility is too vast to summarize here. On the incidence of terms of trade shocks, 
see Easterly et al. (1997), Fernández Arias et al. (2001), Barro and Sala-i-Martín (2004), Loayza et al. (2005) and 
Arora and Vamvakidis (2005). On the role of openness on output volatility, see Easterly et al. (2000), Kose et 
al. (2003), Bekaert et al. (2004) and Cavallo (2005). On the mitigating role of exchange rate flexibility, see Broda 
(2004), and Edwards and Levy Yeyati (2005) and Ramcharan (2007). Raddatz (2007) provides an encompassing 
analysis. Of particular interest for our purposes is a recent line of research that looks into the effects of extreme 
output drops (see, e.g., Becker and Mauro, 2006). 
5 See. i.a., Kraay (2006) and López and Serven (2007) for the impact of poverty on growth, and the latter for 
the feedback of poverty and inequality on growth. 
6 Checchi and Garcia-Peñalosa (2004) also explore the effect of output volatility and economic inequality 
through the channel of human capital. 
7 The same asymmetry is found by De Janvry and Sadoulet (2000) for a panel of 12 Latin American countries 
between 1970 and 1994.  
  3way or the other– López (forthcoming), in a more systematic study, also reports evidence on 
a positive volatility-inequality link. 
 
Micro studies on the distributive consequences of financial crises largely point in the same 
direction. Baldacci, de Mello and Inchauste (2002) argue that financial crises are associated 
with an increase in poverty and, in some cases, income inequality, whereas Corbacho, 
García-Escribano and Inchauste (2007) find that higher unemployment is a significant 
source of income vulnerability during a crisis –and, accordingly, they find that households 
where heads hold more stable public sector jobs are less affected–, and McKenzie (2004) 
shows that the main distributive impact of a crisis is through a large fall in real wages across 
the economy owing to weak labor demand. In turn, Halac and Schmukler (2004) document 
that large (presumably higher-income) depositors were the first to run in the midst of the 
2001 Argentina crisis, shifting the burden of the deposit reprogramming and forceful 
currency conversion disproportionately on smaller (presumably lower-income) savers. 
Finally, Duncan, Beegle, Frankenberg, Sikokid, Strausse and Teruel (2004) find a permanent 
drop in school enrollment during a crisis, as more members of a household need to enter the 
labor force to make up for the declining income of wage earners.  
 
To complement this literature, in this paper we revisit many of these related aspects –and 
some new ones– from a comprehensive perspective. We use panel regressions to examine 
empirically the link between aggregate volatility and extreme output fluctuations (including 
but not limited to financial crises), on the one hand, and income distribution, labor income, 
poverty and school enrollment, on the other. Additionally, we evaluate potential mitigating 
factors such as public spending (as a proxy social safety nest) and labor protection. We find 
that: 
  The adverse effect of an economic contraction is not fully undone during the 
recovery phase. As a result, output volatility is indeed associated with greater 
inequality, both measured as the GINI coefficient and as the relative income 
response across income quintiles. 
  The volatility-inequality link is non linear and asymmetric: extreme output 
contractions (but not extreme output expansions) are correlated with inequality 
beyond what can be explained by standard output volatility measures. 
  4  The adverse effects of volatility and sharp economic contractions are mitigated by 
initial per capita income (low-income countries are affected the most by 
macroeconomic volatility) and public expenditure. 
  The same pattern (adverse effect of volatility and economic contractions, mitigating 
influence of public spending) is found for education (school enrollment) and poverty 
(poverty gap and poverty headcount). 
  Labor markets play a key role in the transmission of aggregate volatility to inequality 
and poverty: labor regulation that increases firing costs attenuates the link, minimum 
wages amplify it, and the labor-to-capital compensation ratio declines with volatility 
and output drops. 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section II, we characterize aggregate volatility in terms 
of measurable variables, and illustrate their incidence across income and development levels. 
In section III, we estimate the impact of output volatility on inequality and poverty, stressing 
its non-linear and asymmetric effects: the fact that extreme output contractions (unlike 
extreme output booms) exert a more than proportional impact. Section IV studies the role 
of mitigating factors (per capita income, fiscal spending and labor protection) and 
documents the effect of volatility on school enrollment. Finally, section V summarizes the 
findings of the paper, and concludes.  
 
II.  The starting point: Aggregate volatility 
 
The first step in our explorations is the characterization of aggregate volatility. For this, we 
deviate from the standard growth literature only slightly. We use three measures for output 
volatility: the standard deviation of log per capita output, of Baxter and King’s band-pass 
filtered log output, and of output detrended by a quadratic trend. In addition to the cyclical 
variability of output, we use two measures of extreme output events, namely, sharp output 
drops that go the beyond the order of cyclical contractions, and that are typically associated 
with economic crises: a 5% cumulative decline in output relative to its level prior to the 
decline, and a Current Depth of Recession (CDR) variable that measures the difference 
between the current GDP and the last local GDP maximum. 
 
  5For reasons that are discussed in the next section, our prior is that aggregate volatility has 
asymmetric, non linear effects: a sharp contraction exerts a more than proportional influence 
on employment, poverty and inequality –that a sharp expansion does not undo completely. 
In order to identify these nonlinearities and asymmetries, good precise measures of aggregate 
volatility are critical. We focus on the post-Bretton Woods era (1975-2005).  
 
a.  First glance 
 
Figures 1 characterizes aggregate volatility for different income (high, middle, low) and 
development (industrial, non-industrial) categories.
8 As can be seen, output volatility in 
developing countries (as measured by the standard deviation of real growth rate over the 
period 1975-2005) almost triples that for the developed group. Similarly, high-income 
countries enjoy greater stability than low- and middle-income economies, even after 
excluding small countries which are likely less diversified and more sensitive to external real 
shocks. 
 
The same picture is obtained when we look at extreme output events, measured in this case 
as a 5% cumulative decline in output relative to its level prior to the decline. Again, the 
propensity to suffer sharp output contractions in non-industrial economies is many times 
larger than in the industrial world, suggesting that the greater output volatility may reflect the 
incidence of these extreme downturns. 
 
 
III.  The ultimate toll: From aggregate volatility to income distribution 
 
A critical –and often overlooked– degree of vulnerability concerns the capacity of countries 
in general, and developing ones in particular, to forestall the negative welfare consequences 
of the adverse swings in economic activity documented in Figure 1. Higher exposure to 
exogenously-triggered output contractions or financial disarray does not imply, per se, larger 
                                                 
8 Categories are drawn from the World Bank’s classification. The middle-income sample include both low- and 
high-middle income countries. Variable definitions and sources as well as summary statistics for all the relevant 
variables in the paper are reported in the Appendix. 
  6income or distributive effects. Alternatively, similar output contractions would tend to affect 
some countries (typically, rich countries where the fraction of low-income population with 
no savings is smaller and is largely covered by a well-deployed social safety net) more than 
others (typically, low-income countries where the majority of the population tends to live on 
their current income). 
 
Moreover, the fact that economic contractions reduce current consumption does not 
necessarily mean that aggregate volatility (namely, a succession of contractions and 
expansion) translates into poorer welfare indicators over the long haul. For that to be true, 
one needs to show, at least, that the recovery phase does not fully undo the deterioration 
over the recessive phase.  
 
In this section, we document the negative effect of output volatility and output drops on 
measures of inequality and poverty, and report evidence on the presence of persistent effects 
of recessions underlying this negative link. To do that, we run 5-year non-overlapping panel 
regressions for a number of alternative measures of output volatility, and test for asymmetric 
effects by controlling separately for output drops and output jumps (where the latter are 
defined as the mirror image of drops). 
 
a.  Distributive impact of output volatility 
 
The preliminary message from a panel regression of income distribution (as measured by the 
GINI coefficient)  on aggregate output volatility (measured as the standard deviation of per 
capita GDP) is clear: volatility increases inequality (Table 1).
9 The findings are comparable 
irrespective of the methodology: the table reports results using fixed-effect panel regressions, 
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM difference estimator, and Blundell and Bond’s (1998) 
GMM system estimator using internal or external instruments.
10  
                                                 
9 Distribution data is particularly difficult to compare across countries because they are often based on different 
measures of welfare and income, and different units of observation (Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Deaton, 2004); 
hence the statistical advantage of panel regressions to control for these country-specific measurement 
methodologies. 
10 Since the results are robust to methodology, for conciseness the remaining tables report results using GMM 
with the following external instruments for output volatility: volatility of terms of trade shocks volatility of 
  7 
The baseline specification includes, in addition to the lagged dependent variable, standard 
growth controls such as human capital (proxied by secondary school enrollment), initial 
income (linear and squared to capture non-linearities), plus the inflation rate (another 
indicator of economic malaise positively correlated with both output volatility and inequality) 
and public expenditure (current government expenditure over GDP) to proxy for social 
programs, which we expect to be negatively associated with poverty and inequality. All of 
them, when significant, display the expected sign.  
 
In addition, the last two columns of the table replicate the specifications in columns 3 and 4 
for the subsample of developing countries. The association, if anything, is stronger, 
dispelling doubts that the result may be driven by differences between developed and 
developing economies –and hinting at the degree of development as a factor influencing 
behind the volatility-inequality result.  
 
Alternative measures of output volatility (using Baxter and King’s band-pass filter, or a 
quadratic trend) confirm these findings (Table 2). Similarly, the findings are not specific to 
the GINI coefficient: replicating the exercise for the share of the income of the average 
household in each quintiles of the income distribution over total income tells a consistent 
story: volatility increases the income share of the upper quintiles at the expense of the lower 
ones (Table 3; column 4 of Table 1 is reproduced for ease of comparison). Moreover, the 
effect is monotonic, increasing with each subsequent quintile. Figure 2 illustrates the 
economic importance of these findings: based on the estimates reported in Table 3, a 
doubling in aggregate volatility leads to an 2.7% increase in the Gini coefficient, a 2.4% 
decline (1.1% increase) in the income share of the poorest (richest) quintile.  
 
b.  Distributive hysteresis and the persistent effect of recessions 
 
The previous findings document the negative link between aggregate volatility, on the one 
hand, and inequality, on the other, but are silent about two aspects that are critical to 
                                                                                                                                                 
growth of (trade weighted) external demand and the volatility of fluctuations in real foreign interest rates. 
Results using the alternative methodologies are available on request. 
  8characterize the welfare consequences of aggregate fluctuations: (i) non-linearities (in 
particular, the distinction between standard cyclical volatility and presumably more damaging 
extreme output events), and (ii) asymmetries (the fact that the losses due to sharp recessions 
are not perfectly recouped during the ensuing expansion, a pattern that would explain the 
association between volatility and inequality over the long run). 
 
As in the previous section, to explore the incidence of extreme negative output events, we 
use two alternative definition of an output event: output drops (defined as recessions with a 
cumulative output loss in excess of 5%) and current depth of recession (CDR, defined as 
recessions with a maximum output decline in excess of 3%) where the decline is computed 
in both cases relative to the GDP at the beginning of the recession. In the regressions, the 
negative output event dummy takes a value of one if the event takes place (or starts) within 
the current 5-year period. In addition, we control for positive output events using the mirror 
image of the output drop and depth of recession dummies, denoted accordingly as output 
jumps and current depth of boom. 
 
The results, reported in Table 4, are encouraging. Once extreme events are controlled for, 
the coefficients for volatility decline substantially but still exerts a significant influence; by 
contrast, extreme output expansions do not appear to play any significant role beyond what 
is already captured by the output volatility variable. This indicates that the greater propensity 
to suffer extreme contractions characteristic of developing economies adds to the deleterious 
effect of regular business cycles on inequality. Moreover, the results suggest that extreme 
events do not exert e symmetric influence: the increase in inequality after a drop is not 
reverted during the subsequent boom. Figure 3 illustrates the economic size of the effect: 
Based on the estimates in column 3 of Table 4, we find that an output drop raises the Gini 
coefficient a sizeable 5%, compared with a meager (and not statistically significant) 0.9% as a 
result of a jump. 
 
IV.  Mitigating factors 
 
There a number of ways in which countries can mitigate the micro impact of macro 
volatility. Individually, agents could insure against such events by saving in good times (both 
  9domestically and abroad) or purchasing insurance against easily verifiable catastrophic 
events. Collectively, the government can (and often does) offer social safety nets that 
alleviate the income effects of uninsured negative shocks. For example, the impact of a sharp 
economic contraction could be softened by the holding of real assets, or by the 
countercyclical public expenditure in social assistance to low income households with no 
savings. If so, it would follow that the income effect of an output drop would tend to be 
milder in countries with larger public expenditure or greater access to (and use of) saving 
instruments.  
 
More generally, a tenet of standard economics is the fact that savings help smooth out 
output fluctuations, so that output volatility should not (fully) translate into consumption 
volatility. However, it is well known that savings among low- and middle-income households 
tend to be, at best, limited –and that access to finance in times of trouble is virtually 
inexistent. Moreover, significant output drops typically involve not simply wage cuts but very 
often a sharp increase in unemployment. Finally, there is a large share of the population out 
of the labor force (most notably, the aged) that obtain their current income from social 
security benefits, pensions and social programs  publicly imperfectly indexed income that 
may be easily diluted in the context of an inflationary crisis. For all these reasons, the 
consequences of output volatility on income distribution could in principle be alleviated by 
savings (which, in turn, would depend on the household’s income that determines its savings 
ratio). On the other hand, for low-income households with no savings, income volatility 
could be smoothed out by non-labor income such as unemployment insurance, social safety 
nets or social security outlays.  
 
Does the level of per capital income reduce the adverse consequences of aggregate volatility 
on income distribution? Does the presence of social safety nets mitigate the effect of output 
fluctuations on the lower quintiles? We examine each of these questions in Table 5. 
 
We first look at per capita income, more precisely at the interaction of initial income with 
our volatility proxy (column 1). The results strongly suggest that income matters for 
resilience: the poorer the country, the more harmful volatility is in terms of income 
distribution, particularly for the lower quintile. We turn next to the role of social 
  10expenditure, proxied by public sector current expenditure over GDP (column 2). The results 
consistently support our priors: public expenditure appears to have a progressive effect on 
income distribution. 
 
Per capita income and public expenditure tend to be highly correlated. Moreover, to the 
extent that per capital income may be simply the reflection of economic development that 
usually entails a larger public sector, the findings may lead to the rather unsurprising –and 
policy-irrelevant– corollary that the richer the country, the better equipped it is to cope with 
aggregate volatility. Column 3 dispels these doubts: when put together, both income and 
public spending retain their explanatory power (if anything, the coefficients increase slightly). 
Moreover, the same applies to income shares (columns 4 to 8) where both interactions are in 
almost all cases significant and consistent with our priors. In particular, the results indicate 
that policy aspects (such as social spending) do have a bearing on the ultimate effect of 
aggregate volatility beyond the country’s level of economic development, shifting the burden 
of aggregate volatility toward the upper income levels.
11 Figure 4 illustrates the economic 
importance of these findings, both for the Gini coefficient and the income shares. 
 
As already noted, volatility may not be the appropriate metric to measure the effects 
documented in the previous tables. More precisely, much in the same way as booms and 
busts tend to have asymmetric and non-linear effects on employment and income –with the 
consequences of large protracted recessions are likely to be proportionally more important 
and persistent than traditional business cycle fluctuations– in principle one could expect the 
same pattern from the mitigating factor.  
 
Indeed, as shown in Table 6, output drops elicit an additional negative effect on inequality. 
Moreover, whereas public spending buffers both the effect from volatility and from extreme 
                                                 
11 We also looked at financial depth (measured as private credit over GDP) as a proxy for the provision of 
saving instruments in good times and credit in bad times, another potential mitigating factor. Interestingly, 
financial depth proved to have the opposite effect: it was positively related to inequality and, when significant, 
augmented the negative impact of aggregate volatility. In principle, this disappointing result is hardly surprising: 
because users of financial instruments typically (and, in developing economies, almost exclusively) belong to 
the upper income classes, a deeper financial system should in principle benefit the rich relative to the poor. By 
contrast, it can be shown that access to financial services (as measured by branch or ATM penetration), both 
improves income distribution and mitigates the effect of aggregate volatility (see Calderón and Levy Yeyati, 
2007). 
 
  11output events, this effect is larger and more consistently significant for the latter. Figure 5 
illustrate the economic importance of these effects: for example, the lower quintile may see 
the impact of a crisis on its income share go from a 5% loss (in the context of low public 
spending, defined as the 25
th percentile value of public spending in our sample) to a 5% gain 
(high public spending, (defined as the 75
th percentile value). These findings are in line with 
the conventional view that social safety nets are most needed in economic crisis, where the 
low-income strata are hit by high unemployment and low real wages. It is this labor market 
channel that we explore in more detail next. 
 
a.  Another look at income distribution: labor markets in volatile environments 
 
Labor income is possibly the main candidate to explain the previous findings, and a key 
channel to account for the volatility-distribution link. Unemployment is typically the single 
most important explanatory factor of the deterioration of income distribution after extreme 
output contractions. Moreover, it is well known that unemployment increases and wages 
decrease during recessions, and that long spells of unemployment may entail permanent 
losses of human capital, downgrading qualified workers to unskilled jobs and ultimately 
excluding them from labor markets.   
 
In this light, one would expect that labor safety nets that mitigate the effect of sharp 
economic downturns on unemployment –at the expense of lower employment rates in good 
times– should also mitigate their effect on equity. Conversely, factors that inhibit price 
adjustment at the expense of quantity adjustment should have a detrimental influence on 
equity in the event of a negative shock. The underlying rationale is simple: in the event of an 
economic recession, a wage cut distributes the burden of adjustment among workers more 
evenly than a payroll cut. Policies that deter layoffs (e.g., by increasing firing costs) should 
then improve income distribution; policies that foster layoffs (e.g., minimum wages that limit 
wage cuts) should worsen it. 
 
With this in mind, we test the incidence of two key characteristics of the labor market on the 
distributive impact of output fluctuations, namely, minimum wages (specifically, the ratio of 
minimum wages to manufacturing labor costs), and firing deterrents, which we measure in 
  12two ways: difficulty of firing (the difficulty and expense of firing a redundant worker)
12 and firing 
costs (the cost of a redundant worker, expressed in weeks of wages). The first one, by 
reducing the margin for wage adjustment, should increase the sensitivity of unemployment 
to aggregate volatility; the other two should have exactly the opposite effect, reducing 
unemployment in bad times at the expense of employment in good times.  
 
The results, reported in Table 7, are perfectly consistent with our priors. Whereas minimum 
wages amplify the consequences of a contraction, the other two variables tend to attenuate 
its impact. Moreover, as Figure 6 shows, these effects are economically important. Thus, 
labor market protection aimed at reducing the cyclical labor turnover, while it certainly may 
introduce other inefficiencies, does insure the worker against aggregate fluctuations. 
 
These findings confirm the relevance of the labor channel to explain the volatility-
distribution link, and suggest an alternative way to approach the distributive effects of 
aggregate volatility: if economic contractions are associated with a combination of increased 
unemployment and lower real wages, we should observe a concomitant decline in the ratio 
of labor to non-labor income.  
 
The question of the distribution of the burden of an economic downturn was a popular 
policy issue in developing countries all through the 1990s –the presumption being that low-
middle  income households with little savings (if any) in unsophisticated financial or illiquid 
durables goods were ill-prepared to withstand the wealth effect of the typical devaluation 
and inflation that accompanied the crises. A different but no less relevant question 
concerned the distribution of the post-crisis recovery effort across different income levels. 
Edwards (1989) addressed this question empirically by studying the impact of a number of 
balance of payment crisis events on the participation of labor income in total output, and 
found no evidence supporting the conventional view that labor tended to bear a 
                                                 
12 The index combines 8 components: (i) whether redundancy is disallowed as a basis for terminating workers; 
(ii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party (such as a government agency) to terminate 1 redundant 
worker; (iii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party to terminate a group of 25 redundant workers; 
(iv) whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate 1 redundant worker; (v) whether the 
employer needs approval from a third party to terminate a group of 25 redundant workers; (vi) whether the law 
requires the employer to consider reassignment or retraining options before redundancy termination; (vii) 
whether priority rules apply for redundancies; and (viii) whether priority rules apply for reemployment. 
  13disproportionate share of the burden. On the other hand, while less directly related to sharp 
economic downturns, recent work by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) document the 
association between an undervalued local currency –typical of a post-crisis scenario– and a 
lower labor to capital compensation ratio. 
 
The question is naturally linked to our exploration: to the extent that the share of labor to 
non-labor income is negatively correlated with total income (a logical implication of the 
lower endowments and saving propensity of the poor), one would expect that a decline in 
the ratio of labor to capital income in countries that have gone through volatile periods and 
deep recessions would translate in a deterioration of the distribution of income.  
 
This is precisely what we examine in Table 8 where the ratio of capital to labor 
compensation is regressed following our baseline specification, and controlling for output 
volatility, extreme output events, and their interactions with public expenditure and labor 
market rigidities. In line with our previous findings, the ratio increases with volatility and 
(more strongly) with output events, and the effect is partially muted by public spending and 
difficulty of firing.
13 In sum, the response of labor income appears to be a decisive (if not the 
main) factor in explaining the adverse distributive effects of aggregate volatility. 
 
b.  Education 
 
In a recent paper, Thomas et al. (2004) find that, during the 1998 Indonesian crisis, 
household spending on education, as well as school enrollment, declined more for poorer 
households. While we cannot replicate these tests for a broader set of countries (due to lack 
of data on spending and enrollment per household income level), we can document the 
broader negative effect of economic contractions on education, as Table 9 clearly shows. 
Moreover, again, we find that public spending plays a compensating role, much in the same 
way as an implicit subsidy to investment in education. Figure 7 further illustrates the effects: 
going from low to high public spending (defined as before as the 25
th and 75
th percentile 
                                                 
13 While the volatility coefficient is barely or not significant once extreme events are controlled for, the 
coefficient declines only slightly. 
  14values in our sample) halves the negative effect of volatility on school enrollment (from -
10% to -5%), and dramatically reverts the impact of extreme output events. 
 
c.  Poverty 
 
The evidence that income shares tend to move in a regressive way as volatility increases does 
not, per se, imply that low income households are worse off in absolute terms in volatile 
economies. More precisely: Is the evidence reported above the reflection of a situation in 
which the rich gains at the expense of the poor in a zero (or negative) sum game, or is it the 
case that rich people can profit from a volatile but growing environment, at no cost in terms 
of the income of the lower quintiles? In other words, do the effects of income distribution 
reported above translate into a deterioration of the poverty indicators? 
 
Table 10 provides a positive answer to that question. The table shows estimates of a 
regression of per capita income growth for the bottom quintile to examine the absolute 
effect of aggregate fluctuations on income of the poor. The tests, which are similar to those 
used above for income distribution, reveal a systematically negative effect of alternative 
measures of volatility on poor households. Again as before, public expenditure appears to 
play a mitigating role, a result robust to alternative versions of the volatility variable.   
 
A consistent story arises when we use a measure of the poverty gap and a poverty headcount 
index,
14 where the negative effect of volatility is alleviated by public expenditure. Once again, 
extreme adverse output events place an additional burden on poverty, beyond the effect of 
cyclical fluctuations, confirming the importance of non-linear effects. The effects, as Table 9 
shows, are economically important, particularly in the face of extreme output declines, when 
public spending may sharply what would otherwise be a dramatic increase in poverty).   
Overall, these results complete a remarkably consistent picture of the undesired welfare 
effects of aggregate volatility, and the benign influence of safety nets. 
 
                                                 
14 Poverty gap ratio is the mean distance separating the population from the poverty line of PPP-adjusted $1 
per day (with the non-poor being given a distance of zero), expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. The 
poverty headcount index is the share of the population with income below the poverty line. All these formulas 
are calculated based on data on individual income. If household-level data are used, the formulas are adjusted 
by the household size times sampling expansion factor for every household i. 
  15 
V.  Taking stock 
 
Developing countries are often (and correctly) characterized by their relatively larger 
aggregate volatility. This concept, however, conflates at least three different degrees of 
vulnerability that contribute to the ultimate effect of volatility on individual incomes: the 
exposure to shocks, the aggregate economy response to the shock, and the resilience of 
individuals within the economy in the face of aggregate fluctuations, which ultimately 
determines the toll imposed by the aggregate malaise on the individuals’ well-being. The 
vulnerability of developing countries to external shocks compounds the effects of these 
three degrees, a distinction that is crucial from the perspective of policy design. 
 
In this paper, we documented the third degree of vulnerability that goes from aggregate 
volatility to income distribution: we showed that volatility and, particularly, adverse extreme 
output events (e.g., macroeconomic crises) have negative and persistent effects on equity and 
poverty, as well as a discouraging effect on school enrollment. More importantly, we showed 
that these undesired consequences of volatility and negative income shocks vary substantially 
as a function of country characteristics: specifically, factors such as per capita income, public 
spending, or labor protection tend to attenuate the individual cost of business cycles and 
sharp recessions.  
 
These findings offer a number of important policy implications. On the one hand, the fact 
that the first two mitigating factors (per capita income and public spending) tend to be 
correlated with economic development a priori indicates that the welfare effects of aggregate 
volatility –and, as a result, the benefits of policies or instruments aimed at reducing 
macroeconomic fluctuations– are more pronounced in developing countries. On the other 
hand, the benign effect of labor protection (as opposed to income protection such as 
minimum wages), combined with relative decline in labor compensation associated with 
aggregate volatility, highlights the insurance benefits of labor regulations, an aspect often 
downplayed relative to their efficiency costs. Third, on a more speculative basis, it hints at an 
alternative explanatory channel for the connection between output volatility and output 
  16growth documented in the economic literature:
15 the persistent human capital losses 
(through protracted unemployment and reduced school enrollment) caused by economic 
contractions. 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Ramey and Ramey (1995) and, more recently, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2005) and 
references therein. 
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  Figure 2
Volatility and Income Distribution






























  21  Figure 3
Volatility, Income Distribution and Asymmetric Effects
Percentage change in the Gini coefficient during episodes of output drops and output jumps


































  Figure 4
Inequality response to aggregate volatility conditional on public spending
Gini coefficient variation conditional on 25th and 75th percentile in distribution of public expenditure
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  22  Figure 5
Inequality response to "crisis volatility" conditional on public expenditure


































  Figure 6
Inequality response to "crisis volatility" conditional on labor regulation

































  23  Figure 7
Human capital response to volatility conditional on public expenditure
Gini coefficient variation conditional on 25th and 75th percentile in distribution of public expenditure
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Volatility and income distribution: Baseline regression
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-100), end-of-period, in logs
Sample of 75 Countries, 1970-2005 (5-year period observations)
All Countries Developing Countries
LSDV GMM(D) GMM(S)-Int GMM(S)-Ext GMM(S)-Int GMM(S)-Ext
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Output Volatility 0.0041 ** 0.0320 ** 0.0217 ** 0.0322 ** 0.0345 ** 0.0420 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of GDP per capita) (0.001)            (0.011)            (0.006)            (0.004)            (0.009)            (0.007)           
Control Variables
L a g g e d  I n e q u a l i t y 0 . 8 8 4 1 * *0 . 4 6 4 6 * *0 . 8 1 6 7 * *0 . 4 8 3 1 * *0 . 7 7 0 3 * *0 . 8 4 3 8 * *
 (Gini coefficient, initial level, logs) (0.019)            (0.083)            (0.021)            (0.065)            (0.036)            (0.033)           
Real Income Per Capita 0.0504 * 0.3344 ** 0.1528 ** 0.3007 ** 0.1426 ** 0.1638 **
 (initial level of real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.031)            (0.119)            (0.035)            (0.073)            (0.064)            (0.063)           
Real Income Per Capita squared -0.0036 * -0.0246 ** -0.0096 ** -0.0183 ** -0.0099 ** -0.0113 **
(0.002)            (0.008)            (0.002)            (0.005)            (0.004)            (0.004)           
Human Capital -0.0066 -0.1098 ** -0.0234 -0.0698 ** -0.0308 ** -0.0199 **
 (Secondary enrollment rate, in logs) (0.013)            (0.039)            (0.017)            (0.023)            (0.012)            (0.010)           
Inflation 0.0051 0.0414 ** 0.0287 ** 0.0143 * 0.0409 ** 0.0559 **
 (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.013)            (0.021)            (0.013)            (0.009)            (0.018)            (0.024)           
Public Expenditure -0.0090 -0.0474 * -0.0339 ** -0.1001 ** -0.0026 -0.0008
 (Current Government Expenditure as % GDP, logs) (0.009)            (0.030)            (0.011)            (0.018)            (0.009)            (0.009)           
Countries / Observations 75 / 484 75 / 411 75 / 486 72 / 470 54 / 342 51 / 326
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test ..   (0.219)            (0.334)            (0.403)            (0.958)            (0.917)           
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.880)            (0.444)            (0.485)            (0.336)            (0.878)            (0.910)           
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Regressions include constant and time dummies.  * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level.
Our regression includes the constant and time dummies (not shown above) and the standard errors are computed using the small sample correction by Windmeijer (2005). 
Note: LSDV represents the ordinary least squares with dummy variables, GMM(D) represents the GMM-IV difference estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), while GMM(S) denotes
the GMM-IV system estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  Finally, output volatility is instrumented using either "internal instruments" (Int) --that is, own lags
of volatility -- or "external instruments" (Ext). External instruments for output volatility are the volatility of terms of trade shocks, volatility of the growth of external demand, and the volatility
of fluctuations in real foreign interest rates.
 
































Volatility and income distribution: Sensitivity to different measures of output volatility
Sample of 75 Countries, 1970-2005 (5-year period observations)
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient (0-100), end-of-period, in logs / Income Shares of Selected Percentiles of the Population (in logs)
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with external instruments   1/
S.D. Real GDP per capita S.D. Real Output
First Band-Pass Quadratic First Band-Pass Quadratic
Differences Filter Trend Differences Filter Trend
V a r i a b l e s [ 1 ][ 2 ][ 3 ][ 4 ][ 5 ][ 6 ]
Output Volatility 0.0322 ** 0.0166 ** 0.0272 ** 0.0381 ** 0.0211 ** 0.0334 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of GDP per capita) (0.004)           (0.008)           (0.011)           (0.004)           (0.008)           (0.011)          
Control Variables
Lagged Inequality 0.4831 ** 0.5634 ** 0.5027 ** 0.4545 ** 0.5403 ** 0.5137 **
 (Gini coefficient, initial level, logs) (0.065)           (0.074)           (0.088)           (0.058)           (0.071)           (0.090)          
Real Income Per Capita 0.3007 ** 0.2777 ** 0.2944 ** 0.3049 ** 0.2859 ** 0.2530 **
 (initial level of real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.073)           (0.081)           (0.082)           (0.068)           (0.076)           (0.097)          
Real Income Per Capita squared -0.0183 ** -0.0167 ** -0.0173 ** -0.0184 ** -0.0174 ** -0.0146 **
(0.005)           (0.005)           (0.005)           (0.004)           (0.005)           (0.006)          
Human Capital -0.0698 ** -0.0537 ** -0.0907 ** -0.0800 ** -0.0552 ** -0.0897 **
 (Secondary enrollment rate, in logs) (0.023)           (0.024)           (0.023)           (0.022)           (0.024)           (0.025)          
Inflation 0.0143 * 0.0069 0.0241 ** 0.0146 * 0.0060 0.0241 **
 (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.009)           (0.010)           (0.011)           (0.008)           (0.010)           (0.010)          
Public Expenditure -0.1001 ** -0.1002 ** -0.0975 ** -0.0979 ** -0.0967 ** -0.0954 **
 (Current Government Expenditure as % GDP, logs) (0.018)           (0.019)           (0.020)           (0.019)           (0.020)           (0.020)          
Countries / Observations 72 / 470 72 / 470 72 / 470 72 / 470 72 / 470 72 / 470
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.403)           (0.324)           (0.524)           (0.412)           (0.300)           (0.539)          
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.336)           (0.319)           (0.269)           (0.341)           (0.315)           (0.252)          
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Regressions include constant and time dummies.  * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level. Our regression includes the
the constant and time dummies (not shown above) and the standard errors are computed using the small sample correction by Windmeijer (2005). Results for the parameter estimate of output volatility
in income share regresssions are reported in Tables A.3 and A.4
1/ External instruments include the volatility of terms of trade shocks, volatility of the growth of external demand and volatility of fluctuations in real international interest rates.





























Volatility and income distribution: Sensitivity to different measures of income distribution
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient and Income Shares of Income Distribution Quintiles, end-of-period, in logs
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with external instruments  1/
Sample of 72 Countries, 1970-2005 (5-year period observations)
Gini  Income Share of Quintiles of the Income Distribution
Variables Coefficient Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Output Volatility 0.0322 ** -0.0383 ** -0.0219 ** -0.0100 * 0.0068 ** 0.0083 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of GDP per capita) (0.004)             (0.008)             (0.006)             (0.005)             (0.002)             (0.004)            
Control Variables
Lagged Inequality 0.4831 ** 0.7292 ** 0.3528 ** 0.3776 ** 0.6376 ** 0.3418 **
(0.065)             (0.026)             (0.030)             (0.024)             (0.025)             (0.043)            
Real Income Per Capita 0.3007 ** -0.5722 ** -0.8448 ** -0.5743 ** 0.2194 ** 0.4965 **
 (initial level of real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.073)             (0.070)             (0.063)             (0.031)             (0.017)             (0.048)            
Real Income Per Capita squared -0.0183 ** 0.0361 ** 0.0542 ** 0.0379 ** -0.0140 ** -0.0322 **
(0.005)             (0.004)             (0.004)             (0.002)             (0.001)             (0.003)            
Human Capital -0.0698 ** 0.0444 ** 0.1031 ** 0.0184 -0.0137 ** -0.0422 **
 (Secondary enrollment rate, in logs) (0.023)             (0.015)             (0.022)             (0.015)             (0.006)             (0.014)            
Inflation 0.0143 * -0.0294 * 0.0153 -0.0214 0.0061 0.0530 **
 (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.009)             (0.018)             (0.026)             (0.014)             (0.004)             (0.008)            
Public Expenditure -0.1001 ** 0.0140 0.0200 0.0348 ** -0.0163 ** -0.0539 **
 (Current Government Expenditure as % GDP, logs) (0.018)             (0.026)             (0.017)             (0.014)             (0.005)             (0.010)            
Countries / Observations 72 / 470 66 / 433 66 / 433 66 / 433 66 / 433 66 / 433
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.403)             (0.665)             (0.508)             (0.710)             (0.795)             (0.918)            
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.336)             (0.302)             (0.660)             (0.695)             (0.959)             (0.707)            
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Regressions include constant and time dummies.  * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level.
Our regression includes the constant and time dummies (not shown above) and the standard errors are computed using the small sample correction by Windmeijer (2005).




































Volatility and income distribution: Asymmetric effects of output fluctuations
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient, end-of-period, in logs
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with external instruments  1/
Sample of 72 Countries, 1970-2005 (5-year period observations)
Baseline Output Output drops Depth of Depth recession
Specification drops and jumps recession and boom
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Output Volatility 0.0322 ** 0.0059 * 0.0081 ** 0.0099 ** 0.0186 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of GDP per capita) (0.004)             (0.00)               (0.00)               (0.00)               (0.00)              
Adverse Output Events ..    0.0540 ** 0.0464 ** 0.0202 * 0.0198 *
 (Ouput drops / Depth of Recession) (0.01)               (0.01)               (0.01)               (0.01)              
Positive Output Events ..    ..    -0.0091 * ..    -0.0089
 (Ouput jumps / Depth of Boom) (0.01)               (0.01)              
Control Variables
Lagged Inequality 0.4831 ** 0.7774 ** 0.7933 ** 0.7087 ** 0.7328 **
(0.065)             (0.018)             (0.025)             (0.022)             (0.028)            
Real Income Per Capita 0.3007 ** 0.2188 ** 0.2116 ** 0.2911 ** 0.2302 **
 (initial level of real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.073)             (0.034)             (0.033)             (0.027)             (0.037)            
Real Income Per Capita squared -0.0183 ** -0.0139 ** -0.0133 ** -0.0196 ** -0.0153 **
(0.005)             (0.002)             (0.002)             (0.002)             (0.002)            
Human Capital -0.0698 ** -0.0191 ** -0.0162 ** -0.0124 ** -0.0137 *
 (Secondary enrollment rate, in logs) (0.023)             (0.007)             (0.008)             (0.006)             (0.008)            
Inflation 0.0143 * -0.0101 -0.0088 -0.0061 -0.0048
 (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.009)             (0.015)             (0.013)             (0.013)             (0.012)            
Public Expenditure -0.1001 ** -0.0346 ** -0.0494 ** -0.0168 * -0.0299 **
 (Current Government Expenditure as % GDP, logs) (0.018)             (0.007)             (0.008)             (0.010)             (0.009)            
Countries / Observations 72 / 470 72 / 470 72 / 470 72 / 470 72 / 470
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.403)             (0.725)             (0.375)             (0.691)             (0.597)            
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.336)             (0.931)             (0.943)             (0.841)             (0.796)            
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Regressions include constant and time dummies.  * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level.
Our regression includes the constant and time dummies (not shown above) and the standard errors are computed using the small sample correction by Windmeijer (2005).
1/ External instruments include the volatility of terms of trade shocks, volatility of the growth of external demand and volatility of fluctuations in real international interest rates.
































Volatility and income distribution: Mitigating factors
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient and Income Shares of Income Distribution Quintiles, end-of-period, in logs
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with external instruments  1/
Sample of 72 Countries, 1970-2005 (5-year period observations)
Gini Coefficient Income Share of Quintiles of the Income Distribution
Variables [1] [2] [3] Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Output Volatility 0.2454 ** 0.0234 ** 0.3171 ** -0.1960 ** -0.0690 * -0.0716 * 0.0265 * 0.0789 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of GDP per capita) (0.024)          (0.003)          (0.043)          (0.062)          (0.036)          (0.037)          (0.014)          (0.025)         
Output Volatility * Real Income per Capita -0.0317 ** ..    -0.0363 ** 0.0252 ** 0.0010 * 0.0090 * -0.0039 ** -0.0013
(0.003)          (0.006)          (0.008)          (0.001)          (0.005)          (0.002)          (0.003)         
Output Volatility * Public Expenditure ..    -0.0127 ** -0.0162 ** 0.0085 ** 0.0199 * 0.0071 ** -0.0016 ** -0.0263 **
(0.002)          (0.003)          (0.004)          (0.012)          (0.002)          (0.001)          (0.010)         
Control Variables
Lagged Inequality 0.4126 ** 0.4267 ** 0.4854 ** 0.6918 ** 0.4199 ** 0.3608 ** 0.5036 ** 0.4437 **
(0.040)          (0.047)          (0.053)          (0.027)          (0.033)          (0.018)          (0.031)          (0.042)         
Real Income Per Capita 0.3989 ** 0.3262 ** 0.4938 ** -0.6564 ** -0.7884 ** -0.4900 ** 0.2880 ** 0.4277 **
 (initial level of real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.061)          (0.068)          (0.065)          (0.122)          (0.080)          (0.041)          (0.027)          (0.042)         
Real Income Per Capita squared -0.0244 ** -0.0203 ** -0.0302 ** 0.0410 ** 0.0486 ** 0.0329 ** -0.0180 ** -0.0279 **
(0.004)          (0.004)          (0.004)          (0.008)          (0.005)          (0.003)          (0.002)          (0.003)         
Human Capital -0.0507 ** -0.0767 ** -0.0376 ** 0.0161 0.1762 ** 0.0014 -0.0310 ** -0.0411 **
 (Secondary enrollment rate, in logs) (0.018)          (0.013)          (0.012)          (0.020)          (0.018)          (0.015)          (0.006)          (0.014)         
Inflation 0.0088 0.0013 0.0244 -0.0650 ** 0.0076 -0.0404 ** 0.0146 ** 0.0354 **
 (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.007)          (0.008)          (0.018)          (0.024)          (0.018)          (0.014)          (0.005)          (0.014)         
Public Expenditure -0.0722 ** -0.0778 ** -0.0769 ** 0.0470 ** 0.0275 * 0.0085 -0.0227 ** -0.0196
 (Current Government Expenditure as % GDP, logs) (0.014)          (0.014)          (0.017)          (0.014)          (0.016)          (0.009)          (0.005)          (0.015)         
Countries / Observations 72 / 470 72 / 470 72 / 470 66 / 433 66 / 433 66 / 433 66 / 433 66 / 433
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.686)          (0.323)          (0.669)          (0.798)          (0.459)          (0.747)          (0.747)          (0.897)         
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.254)          (0.329)          (0.385)          (0.272)          (0.552)          (0.744)          (0.744)          (0.779)         
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Regressions include constant and time dummies.  * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level. Our regression includes the constant term and time dummies (not 
shown above) and the standard errors are computed using the small sample correction by Windmeijer (2005).
1/ External instruments include the volatility of terms of trade shocks, volatility of the growth of external demand and volatility of fluctuations in real international interest rates.

































Volatility and income distribution: Nonlinear effect of output fluctuations
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient and Income Shares of Income Distribution Quintiles, end-of-period, in logs
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with external instruments  1/
Sample of 72 Countries, 1970-2005 (5-year period observations)
Gini Income Share of Quintiles of the Income Distribution
Variables Coefficient Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Output Volatility 0.0110 ** -0.0107 -0.0142 -0.0031 -0.0055 0.0158 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of GDP per capita) (0.005)          (0.011)          (0.011)          (0.006)          (0.112)          (0.007)         
Output Volatility * Public Expenditure -0.0068 ** 0.0085 ** 0.0080 * 0.0064 ** -0.0019 -0.0032 *
(0.002)          (0.003)          (0.004)          (0.002)          (0.037)          (0.002)         
Output Drops 0.1977 ** -0.5763 ** -0.3632 ** -0.2764 ** 0.1311 ** 0.0172 **
(0.060)          (0.150)          (0.103)          (0.092)          (0.033)          (0.007)         
Output Drops * Public Expenditure -0.0615 ** 0.1879 ** 0.1023 ** 0.0893 ** -0.0427 ** -0.0059 *
(0.021)          (0.050)          (0.032)          (0.031)          (0.011)          (0.003)         
Control Variables
Lagged Inequality 0.5408 ** 0.7683 ** 0.4462 ** 0.4047 ** 0.7320 ** 0.4399 **
(0.065)          (0.026)          (0.038)          (0.023)          (0.026)          (0.054)         
Real Income Per Capita 0.1270 * -0.6811 ** -0.9013 ** -0.6443 ** 0.2445 ** 0.4417 **
 (initial level of real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.080)          (0.101)          (0.072)          (0.045)          (0.018)          (0.047)         
Real Income Per Capita squared -0.0089 * 0.0443 ** 0.0573 ** 0.0416 ** -0.0157 ** -0.0280 **
(0.005)          (0.006)          (0.004)          (0.003)          (0.001)          (0.003)         
Human Capital -0.1197 ** 0.0895 ** 0.2192 ** 0.0633 ** -0.0407 ** -0.0799 **
 (Secondary enrollment rate, in logs) (0.025)          (0.036)          (0.042)          (0.016)          (0.005)          (0.018)         
Inflation 0.0976 ** 0.0152 0.0767 ** -0.0117 0.0026 0.0508 **
 (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.013)          (0.026)          (0.030)          (0.018)          (0.006)          (0.018)         
Public Expenditure -0.0480 ** -0.1229 ** -0.0675 * 0.0223 0.0127 * -0.0362 **
 (Current Government Expenditure as % GDP, logs) (0.024)          (0.033)          (0.042)          (0.019)          (0.008)          (0.017)         
Countries / Observations 72 / 470 66 / 433 66 / 433 66 / 433 66 / 433 66 / 433
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.551)          (0.542)          (0.759)          (0.811)          (0.826)          (0.900)         
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.993)          (0.376)          (0.690)          (0.655)          (0.975)          (0.963)         
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Regressions include constant and time dummies.  * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level.
Our regression includes the constant and time dummies (not shown above) and the standard errors are computed using the small sample correction by Windmeijer (2005).







































Volatility and income distribution: The role of labor market protection
Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient and Income Shares of Income Distribution Quintiles, end-of-period, in logs
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with external instruments  1/
Sample of 72 Countries, 1970-2005 (5-year period observations)
Output Drops Current Depth of Recession
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Minimum Difficulty of Firing Minimum Difficulty of Firing
Variables Wages Firing Costs Wages Firing Costs
Output Volatility 0.0087 0.0357 ** 0.0038 -0.0036 0.0510 ** -0.0085
 (S.D. annual log differences of GDP per capita) (0.007)             (0.009)             (0.013)             (0.009)             (0.016)             (0.012)            
Output Volatility * Public Expenditure -0.0022 -0.0037 -0.0089 ** -0.0138 ** -0.0072 ** -0.0071 **
(0.003)             (0.003)             (0.002)             (0.004)             (0.003)             (0.003)            
Output Volatility * Labor Market Rigidities -0.0030 -0.0005 ** 0.0000 -0.0037 -0.0007 ** 0.0003
(0.004)             (0.000)             (0.000)             (0.005)             (0.000)             (0.001)            
Output Drops 0.1729 ** 0.2133 ** 0.1575 ** ..    ..    ..   
 (S.D. annual log differences of GDP per capita) (0.060)             (0.094)             (0.080)            
Output Drops * Public Expenditure -0.0557 ** -0.0698 ** -0.0457 * ..    ..    ..   
(0.020)             (0.032)             (0.026)            
Output Drops * Labor Market Rigidities 0.0036 * -0.0007 * -0.0003 ..    ..    ..   
(0.002)             (0.000)             (0.000)            
Current Depth of Recession (CDR) ..    ..    ..    0.2085 ** 0.3036 ** 0.3340 **
(0.085)             (0.080)             (0.070)            
CDR * Public Expenditure ..    ..    ..    -0.0584 ** -0.0993 ** -0.1107 **
(0.027)             (0.027)             (0.023)            
CDR * Labor Market Rigidities ..    ..    ..    0.0067 ** -0.0015 ** -0.0008 **
(0.002)             (0.000)             (0.000)            
Control Variables
Lagged Inequality 0.8785 ** 0.2649 ** 0.3103 ** 0.6543 ** 0.4795 ** 0.4428 **
(0.040)             (0.035)             (0.044)             (0.083)             (0.048)             (0.043)            
Real Income Per Capita 0.2113 ** 0.7363 ** 0.6927 ** 0.2574 ** 0.4782 ** 0.5170 **
 (initial level of real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.074)             (0.057)             (0.064)             (0.117)             (0.067)             (0.065)            
Real Income Per Capita squared -0.0141 ** -0.0463 ** -0.0428 ** -0.0156 ** -0.0305 ** -0.0318 **
(0.005)             (0.004)             (0.004)             (0.007)             (0.004)             (0.004)            
Human Capital -0.0436 ** -0.1201 ** -0.1330 ** -0.0830 ** -0.1346 ** -0.1447 **
 (Secondary enrollment rate, in logs) (0.015)             (0.024)             (0.012)             (0.036)             (0.024)             (0.017)            
Inflation -0.0112 -0.0116 0.0060 -0.0162 -0.0088 0.0000
 (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.018)             (0.012)             (0.019)             (0.027)             (0.016)             (0.019)            
Public Expenditure 0.0463 * -0.0795 ** -0.1085 ** -0.0563 * -0.0276 -0.0822 **
 (Current Government Expenditure as % GDP, logs) (0.024)             (0.022)             (0.018)             (0.032)             (0.024)             (0.018)            
Countries / Observations 59 / 392 72 / 470 72 / 470 59 / 392 72 / 470 72 / 470
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.950)             (0.468)             (0.433)             (0.933)             (0.770)             (0.603)            
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.892)             (0.282)             (0.268)             (0.272)             (0.314)             (0.240)            
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Regressions include constant and time dummies.  * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level.
Our regression includes the constant and time dummies (not shown above) and the standard errors are computed using the small sample correction by Windmeijer (2005).









































Volatility and factor distribution: Who carries the burden?
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Retribution to Capital to Labor Compensation, (rK / wL)
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with external instruments  1/
Sample of 48 Countries, 1970-2005 (5-year period observations)
Firing Difficulting Output drops Current depth of recession (CDR)
Baseline Cost of Firing Firing Cost Diff. Firing Firing Cost Diff. Firing
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Output Volatility (Vdy) 0.7543 ** 1.0362 ** 0.4655 ** 0.6900 ** 0.7312 ** 1.1543 ** 0.8813 ** 0.6720 ** -0.0094
 (S.D. annual log differences of GDP per capita) (0.131)           (0.115)          (0.173)          (0.146)           (0.190)           (0.223)           (0.156)           (0.270)           (0.264)          
Vdy * Public Expenditure -0.2496 ** -0.3335 ** -0.1813 ** -0.2381 ** -0.2269 ** -0.4398 ** -0.2782 ** -0.2028 ** -0.0342
(0.045)           (0.038)          (0.062)          (0.049)           (0.063)           (0.073)           (0.046)           (0.081)           (0.078)          
Vdy * Labor market rigidities ..    -0.0009 ** 0.0013 ..    -0.0009 ** 0.0023 ..    -0.0009 ** 0.0027 *
(0.000)          (0.002)          (0.000)           (0.002)           (0.000)           (0.002)          
Extreme Output Event (EOE) ..    ..    ..    1.4035 ** 0.2063 1.9585 ** 0.5318 * 0.5501 * 1.0501 **
(0.490)           (0.582)           (0.390)           (0.288)           (0.337)           (0.205)          
EOE * Public Expenditure ..    ..    ..    -0.4711 ** -0.0557 -0.5861 ** -0.2354 ** -0.1858 * -0.2831 **
(0.176)           (0.178)           (0.142)           (0.102)           (0.107)           (0.081)          
EOE * Labor market rigidities ..    ..    ..    ..    0.0000 -0.0020 ** ..    0.0003 -0.0079 **
(0.001)           (0.001)           (0.001)           (0.002)          
Control Variables
Lagged (rk/wL) 0.6150 ** 0.5181 ** 0.6134 ** 0.6095 ** 0.5925 ** 0.4303 ** 0.5754 ** 0.6273 ** 0.6982 **
(0.028)           (0.033)          (0.036)          (0.046)           (0.038)           (0.050)           (0.045)           (0.051)           (0.042)          
Real Income Per Capita 0.3249 ** 1.0004 ** 0.5252 ** 0.2345 ** 0.4180 ** 0.3250 * 0.5681 ** 0.5047 ** 0.3789 *
 (initial level of real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.095)           (0.157)          (0.192)          (0.110)           (0.129)           (0.194)           (0.159)           (0.185)           (0.200)          
Real Income Per Capita squared -0.0169 ** -0.0593 ** -0.0301 ** -0.0151 ** -0.0238 ** -0.0203 * -0.0330 ** -0.0271 ** -0.0207 *
(0.006)           (0.010)          (0.012)          (0.007)           (0.008)           (0.012)           (0.009)           (0.011)           (0.012)          
Human Capital -0.1751 ** -0.2431 ** -0.1771 ** -0.1075 ** -0.2491 ** -0.0638 * -0.2377 ** -0.3285 ** -0.1956 **
 (Secondary enrollment rate, in logs) (0.040)           (0.037)          (0.045)          (0.044)           (0.050)           (0.036)           (0.050)           (0.074)           (0.054)          
Inflation -0.2469 ** -0.2649 ** -0.1996 ** -0.2339 ** -0.2261 ** -0.4572 ** -0.1725 ** -0.2172 ** -0.2384 **
 (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.042)           (0.036)          (0.058)          (0.064)           (0.064)           (0.062)           (0.047)           (0.060)           (0.069)          
Public Expenditure -0.3779 ** -0.3025 ** -0.3249 ** -0.1811 ** -0.2415 ** -0.2316 ** -0.2175 ** -0.2642 ** -0.3071 **
 (Current Government Expenditure as % GDP, logs) (0.048)           (0.052)          (0.056)          (0.071)           (0.072)           (0.038)           (0.051)           (0.061)           (0.056)          
Countries / Observations 48 / 251 48 / 251 48 / 251 48 / 251 48 / 251 48 / 251 48 / 251 48 / 251 48 / 251
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.707)           (0.621)          (0.886)          (0.599)           (0.401)           (0.324)           (0.328)           (0.432)           (0.411)          
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.460)           (0.466)          (0.342)          (0.492)           (0.548)           (0.252)           (0.681)           (0.503)           (0.326)          
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Regressions include constant and time dummies.  * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level. Standard errors are computed using the small sample correction by Windmeijer (2005).
1/ External instruments include the volatility of terms of trade shocks, volatility of the growth of external demand and volatility of fluctuations in real international interest rates.
































Dependent Variable: Enrollment Rate in Secondary Schooling (in logs)
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with external instruments  1/
Sample of 48 Countries, 1970-2005 (5-year period observations)
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
Output Volatility -0.0873 ** -0.4213 ** -0.2376 ** -0.1285
 (S.D. annual log differences of GDP per capita) (0.023)             (0.158)             (0.087)             (0.104)            
Output Volatility * Public Expenditure ..    0.1055 ** 0.0617 ** 0.0224
(0.053)             (0.031)             (0.037)            
Output Drop ..    ..    -0.8593 ** ..   
(0.110)            
Output Drop * Public Expenditure ..    ..    0.2810 ** ..   
(0.038)            
Current Depth of Recession (CDR) ..    ..    ..    -0.8213 **
(0.122)            
CDR * Public Expenditure ..    ..    ..    0.2765 **
(0.044)            
Control Variables
Real Income Per Capita 1.0894 ** 1.1339 ** 1.0549 ** 1.0662 **
 (initial level of real GDP per capita, in logs) (0.233)             (0.193)             (0.159)             (0.155)            
Real Income Per Capita squared -0.0452 ** -0.0452 ** -0.0396 ** -0.0416 **
(0.014)             (0.012)             (0.010)             (0.009)            
Inflation -0.1509 ** -0.1497 ** -0.1237 ** -0.1568 **
 (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.044)             (0.043)             (0.028)             (0.027)            
Public Expenditure -0.2847 ** -0.4089 ** -0.3748 ** -0.2746 **
 (Current Government Expenditure as % GDP, logs) (0.075)             (0.106)             (0.061)             (0.062)            
Countries / Observations 72 / 470 72 / 470 72 / 470 72 / 470
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.321)             (0.190)             (0.482)             (0.400)            
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.286)             (0.674)             (0.210)             (0.200)            
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Regressions include constant and time dummies.  * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent
 
level. Our regression includes the constant and time dummies (not shown above) and we compute small-sample bias corrected standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005).

















































Dependent Variable: Income growth for poorest quintile, Poverty Gap and Headcount Index at PPP $1 a day (in percentages), end-of-period, in logs
Estimation Method: GMM-IV System Estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with external instruments  1/
Sample of 48 Countries, 1970-2005 (5-year period observations)
Growth of the Income of the Poor Poverty Gap Poverty Headcount
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Output Volatility -0.2406 * -4.2503 ** -5.9379 ** -4.3601 ** 0.3131 ** 1.6651 ** 0.2195 ** -0.0422 0.2452 ** 1.5952 ** 0.8430 ** 1.0962 **
 (S.D. annual log differences of GDP per capita) (0.143)          (0.698)          (1.015)          (0.696)          (0.073)          (0.369)          (0.051)          (0.239)          (0.039)          (0.313)          (0.310)          (0.077)         
Output Volatility * Public Expenditure ..    1.3186 ** 1.5302 ** 1.0848 ** ..    -0.5207 ** -0.0805 ** 0.0314 ..    -0.5282 ** -0.2531 ** -0.3305 **
(0.250)          (0.339)          (0.246)          (0.121)          (0.041)          (0.086)          (0.108)          (0.107)          (0.026)         
Output Drop ..    ..    -0.8429 ** ..    ..    ..    2.7795 ** ..    ..    ..    1.8069 ** ..   
(0.201)          (0.879)          (0.828)         
Output Drop * Public Expenditure ..    ..    0.8902 ** ..    ..    ..    -1.0167 ** ..    ..    ..    -0.6052 ** ..   
(0.129)          (0.293)          (0.268)         
Depth of Recession ..    ..    ..    0.3322 ..    ..    ..    2.5845 ** ..    ..    ..    0.0482
(0.231)          (0.478)          (0.077)         
Depth of Recession * Public Expenditure ..    ..    ..    0.8121 ** ..    ..    ..    -0.8466 ** ..    ..    ..    -0.0858 **
(0.173)          (0.160)          (0.026)         
Control Variables
Economic Growth 0.8862 ** 0.8771 ** 0.9440 ** 1.0943 ** -0.0954 ** -0.1094 ** -0.1739 ** -0.0908 ** -0.0713 ** -0.0618 ** -0.0918 ** -0.0925 **
 (average annual growth rate in GDP per capita) (0.047)          (0.060)          (0.048)          (0.042)          (0.017)          (0.014)          (0.016)          (0.016)          (0.013)          (0.019)          (0.026)          (0.025)         
Human Capital 2.8931 ** 2.3366 ** 1.8446 ** 1.1717 ** -2.7309 ** -2.3609 ** -1.7283 ** -0.6259 ** -2.1038 ** -1.9463 ** -1.8405 ** -2.3896 **
 (Secondary enrollment rate, in logs) (0.398)          (0.314)          (0.287)          (0.230)          (0.215)          (0.197)          (0.296)          (0.244)          (0.125)          (0.160)          (0.261)          (0.280)         
Inflation -0.7410 ** 2.8770 ** 2.4173 ** 2.7959 ** -0.5058 ** -0.3763 * -0.6780 -0.6830 -0.3696 ** -0.5477 ** -0.2140 -0.4321
 (CPI inflation rate, in logs) (0.169)          (0.330)          (0.407)          (0.471)          (0.221)          (0.213)          (0.551)          (0.456)          (0.106)          (0.161)          (0.161)          (0.469)         
Trade Openness 0.8420 ** 2.9343 ** 2.5874 ** 2.4585 ** -0.5984 ** -0.6595 ** -0.4772 ** -0.4201 ** -0.4122 ** -0.5813 ** -0.3733 ** -0.7394 **
 (Exports and Imports as % GDP, logs) (0.362)          (0.347)          (0.344)          (0.350)          (0.128)          (0.130)          (0.158)          (0.076)          (0.062)          (0.091)          (0.129)          (0.148)         
Public Expenditure -1.5864 ** -3.2731 ** -3.1063 ** -2.3165 ** 0.7197 ** 1.0564 ** 0.6586 ** 0.7492 ** 0.1773 0.7779 ** 0.3508 -0.3105
 (Current Government Expenditure as % GDP, logs) (0.393)          (0.430)          (0.460)          (0.402)          (0.296)          (0.227)          (0.221)          (0.195)          (0.177)          (0.167)          (0.317)          (0.379)         
Countries / Observations 65 /427 65 /427 65 /427 65 /427 48 / 243 48 / 243 48 / 243 48 / 243 48 / 243 48 / 243 48 / 243 48 / 243
Specification Tests (p-values)
 - Sargan Test (0.430)          (0.394)          (0.452)          (0.576)          (0.332)          (0.325)          (0.483)          (0.455)          (0.226)          (0.392)          (0.729)          (0.675)         
 - 2nd. Order Correlation (0.363)          (0.360)          (0.454)          (0.502)          (0.910)          (0.765)          (0.540)          (0.560)          (0.546)          (0.441)          (0.738)          (0.372)         
Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. Regressions include constant and time dummies.  * (**) denotes statistical significance at the 10 (5) percent level. The standard errors are computed using the  small sample correction by Windmeijer (2005)
1/ External instruments include the volatility of terms of trade shocks, volatility of the growth of external demand and volatility of fluctuations in real international interest rates.
 
 










































Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and Construction Source
Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient of Income Inequality (0-100), end of period, and expressed in logs Authors' construction using Deininger and Squire (1996), 
Milanovic (2000) and World Bank's World Development 
Indicators (WDI).
Income Shares Income shares per quintile from the poorest (First) to the richest (Fifth), in 
percentages (%), end of period, and expressed in logs.
Authors' construction using Deininger and Squire (1996), 
Milanovic (2000) and World Bank's World Development 
Indicators.
Poverty Gap Poverty gap at $1 a day (PPP), end-of-period, in percentages, and expressed in logs. World Bank's World Development Indicators and POVCAL
Poverty Headcount Index Poverty headcount ratio at $1 a day (PPP), end of period, as percentage of 
population, and expressed in logs.
World Bank's World Development Indicators and POVCAL
Real Income per capita Ratio of real GDP (in US$ at 2000 prices) to total population, beginning of period, 
and expressed in logs.
Authors' construction using Summers and Heston (1991) and The 
World Bank's WDI.
Economic Growth Log difference of real GDP per capita. Authors' construction using Summers and Heston (1991) and The 
World Bank's WDI.
Human Capital Ratio of total secondary enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the age 
group that officially corresponds to that level of education. 
Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) and The World Bank's WDI
Inflation CPI inflation rate, in logs.  It is computed as log((1+dp)*100), where dp is the 
inflation rate. This transformation smooths the original variable and gives less 
weight to hyperinflation episodes.
Author’s calculations using data from IFS and the publications of
the Central Bank. The method of calculations is based on Beck,
Demiguc-Kunt and Levine (1999).
Current Government Expenditure Current Government Expenditure as percentage of GDP, average of period, and 
expressed in logs.
The World Bank's World Development Indicators and IMF's
Government Financial Statistics
Log of the ratio of exports and imports (in 1995 US$) to GDP (in 1995 US$). Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) and The World Bank (2003).
Minimum Wages Ratio of minimum wages to labor cost per worker in manufacturing in current US 
dollars per year. Data on labor costs per worker are from plant-level surveys 
covering relatively large firms, mostly in the formal sector of the economy.  Figures 
are converted into US dollars using the average exchange rate for each year.
Rama and Artecona (2002)
Difficulty of Firing The difficulty of hiring index measures (i) whether fixed-term contracts are 
prohibited for permanent tasks; (ii) the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-
term contracts; and (iii) the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or first-time 
employee to the average value added per worker.  This index takes values between 
0 and 100, with higher values indicating higher ridigities.
Doing Business, Various issues
Firing Costs The firing cost indicator measures the cost of advance notice requirements, 
severance payments and penalties due when terminating a redundant worker, 
expressed in weekly wages. If the firing cost adds up to 8 or fewer weeks of salary, 
a score of 0 is assigned for the purposes of calculating the aggregate ease of doing 
business ranking. If the cost adds up to more than 8 weeks of salary, the score is 
the number of weeks.
Doing Business, Various issues
Output Volatility Standard deviation in real output per capita, in logs --as in Fatas and Mihov (2006). 
We compute the standard deviation of the cyclical component of output per capita 
using the following filters: first differences, quadratic trend, and band-pass filter.
Authors' construction using Summers and Heston (1991) and The 
World Bank's WDI.
Output Drop Dummy that takes the value of 1 when there is cumulative output loss larger than 
5% of the pre-drop GDP within the period.
Authors' construction following Becker and Mauro (2006)
Current Depth of Recession Dummy that takes the value of 1 whenever there is an output decline in excess of 
3% of the pre-drop GDP within the period.
Authors' construction following Becker and Mauro (2006)
Volatility of Terms of Trade Changes Standard deviation of the annual log differences of the terms of trade index. Authors' construction using The World Bank's WDI
Volatility of Foreign Growth Standard deviation of the trade-weighted annual growth of the main trading
partners of the corresponding country.
Authors' construction using Summers and Heston (1991), The 
World Bank's WDI, and the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics.
Volatility of World Real Interest Rates Standard deviation of the world real interest rate annual changes. Author’s calculations with data from the IMF's International 
Financial Statistics






  35  Table A.2
Sample Statistics
Sample of 72 countries, 1970-2005 (5-year non-overlapping observations)
Average Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Inequality and Poverty   (in logs)
Gini Coefficient 3.67 0.23 3.09 4.15
Income Share: First Quartile 1.73 0.38 0.40 2.39
Income Share: Second Quartile 2.30 0.31 0.94 2.90
Income Share: Third Quartile 2.70 0.23 1.39 3.12
Income Share: Fourth Quartile 3.05 0.22 1.73 3.81
Income Share: Fifth Quartile 3.84 0.19 3.34 4.25
Poverty Gap 0.74 1.96 -4.61 4.00
Poverty Headcount 2.02 1.69 -3.00 4.49
Determinants   (in logs)
Real Income per capita 8.00 1.49 4.82 10.53
Education 3.89 0.68 1.49 4.99
Inflation 4.75 0.25 4.59 6.83
Current Government Expenditure 3.01 0.49 1.03 4.33
Output Volatility 0.73 0.73 -1.35 2.69
Trade Openness 3.99 0.63 2.26 5.37
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